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Abstract—Achieving information-theoretic security using ex-
plicit coding scheme in which unlimited computational power
for eavesdropper is assumed, is one of the main topics is security
consideration. It is shown that polar codes are capacity achieving
codes and have a low complexity in encoding and decoding.
It has been proven that polar codes reach to secrecy capacity
in the binary-input wiretap channels in symmetric settings for
which the wiretapper’s channel is degraded with respect to
the main channel. The first task of this paper is to propose
a coding scheme to achieve secrecy capacity in asymmetric
nonbinary-input channels while keeping reliability and security
conditions satisfied. Our assumption is that the wiretap channel
is stochastically degraded with respect to the main channel and
message distribution is unspecified. The main idea is to send
information set over good channels for Bob and bad channels
for Eve and send random symbols for channels that are good
for both. In this scheme the frozen vector is defined over
all possible choices using polar codes ensemble concept. We
proved that there exists a frozen vector for which the coding
scheme satisfies reliability and security conditions. It is further
shown that uniform distribution of the message is the necessary
condition for achieving secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
A notion of security named physical layer security defined
by Wyner established an area of research in the world [2]. It
uses the channel for its purpose by coding and other techniques
in communication. Wyner’s initial work assumes sender wants
to send a confidential message to receiver without adversary
being able to decode it. It was shown that if the channel
from sender to receiver is statistically better than the channel
from sender to adversary, secure and reliable communication
is possible[2].
M is the k-bit message that is supposed to be sent. Encoder
maps M to codeword X and sends it on the channel. Bob
receives sequence Y on the main channel Wm and Eve receives
sequence Z on the wiretap channel Ww. Finally decoder maps
Y to an estimate of message Mˆ . The main purpose is to
design a system for sending message reliably and secure on
the channel when message length tends to infinity. Reliably
is measured in terms of probability of error in rebuilding
message. For a reliable system the following condition should
be satisfied:
Reliability : lim
k→∞
Pr(M 6= Mˆ) = 0 (1)
Security is usually measured in terms of the normalized
mutual information between the message M and Eve’s obser-
vations Z. Encoding algorithms should satisfy the following to
be called as secure:
Weak Security : lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z)
k
= 0 (2)
Intuitively, (2) means that observing Z does not provide
much information about M. Maurer discussed in [3], [4] that
the conventional notion of security (2) is a weak notion.
Indeed, it is easy to construct examples where k1−ε out of
the k message bits are disclosed to Eve while still satisfying
(2). So Maurer defined another condition in [3]:
Strong Security : lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z) = 0 (3)
Notice that both security conditions (2) and (3) are
information-theoretic not computational: there is not any lim-
itation for computational power of adversary, and security
does not depend on computational complexity of algorithm.
Basically the leakage of the information must be prevented and
it is unlike the other works like [16], [17] and [18] in which
the marginal information is leveraged as auxiliary information
for reasoning.
A. Assumptions and Settings
Our coding scheme is based on polar coding presented
in[11]. Polar codes achieve the capacity of binary-input DMCs.
It is shown in [11] that for sufficiently large block length the
channel turn into a perfect channel or a complete noisy one.
Noiseless channels are called good channels and the other ones
are called bad channels.
Main idea of our construction is as following: Random
symbols are transmitted over those channels that are good
for both Eve and Bob. Information symbols are transmitted
over those channels that are good for Bob but bad for Eve,
and a fixed vector is transmitted over those channels that are
bad for both Bob and Eve which is defined over all possible
choices using polar coding ensemble. We prove that there exist
a sequence of frozen symbols that our coding scheme satisfies
the reliability and security condition. In our proposed coding
scheme we consider asymmetric settings and wiretap channel
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Ww is degraded with respect to Wm and both have nonbinary-
input alphabet.
B. Backgrounds and Related Works
Wyner considered a condition in which both main and wire-
tap channels are discrete memoryless channels and wiretap
channel, is degraded with respect to main channel. He proved
that for rates lower than a constant number he called secrecy
capacity, reliable and secure transfer of data is possible [2].
After Wyner, some works fulfilled in this area like [5] and [6].
In some of them like [7], [8)] a constraint is assumed on the
computational power of eavesdropper.
A large number of works in information-theoretic security,
prove the existence of a code sequences which using them
leads to achieving secrecy capacity, but a few number of
them design explicit encoding-decoding algorithms. Explicit
algorithms was presented in [9] and [10] and led to achieving
secrecy capacity. In [8)] a situation is studied that assume a
computational power constraint on adversary.
There are other works similar to ours like [12],[13] and
[14] but main differences should be mentioned. [13] and [12]
considered binary-input channels for symmetric setting but
our contributions is for asymmetric nonbinary-input channels.
Moreover the focus of [14] is on utilizing privacy amplification
protocol and information distillation for key agreement but we
only consider pure information-theoretic security. In [13] the
distribution of message is assumed to be uniform But we don’t
consider any specific distribution on the message which is a
fair assumption on message M.
Organization
In Section II, relevant concepts related to wiretap channels,
in order to show an expression for the secrecy capacity is
represented in the setting where Wm and Ww are DMC and
Ww is degraded with respect to Wm. Also the notion of
symmetric channels and secrecy capacity has been defined.
Section III is devoted to polar codes and important theorems
that are necessary for our proofs. We present the proposed
coding scheme in Section IV and proofs show the security
and reliability of proposed scheme and also the code rate
approached to secrecy capacity while the message distribution
is uniform. We conclude the paper in Section VI with a brief
discussion of further results.
Notation definition
We denote random variables (RVs) by upper case letters,
such as X, Y and their sample values by the corresponding
lower case letters, such as x, y and calligraphic font shows
the alphabet set of related random variable. For example, X
shows the alphabet set of X and |X | demonstrates the alphabet
size. PX is the distribution of X. If f(x) and g(x) are defined
on a subset of real numbers then we write f(x) = O(g(x))
if for large x there exists a constant number M for which
the inequality f(x) ≤ M(g(x)) holds. Notation aN1 is used
instead of row vector (a1, a2, ..., aN ) and notation aA is used
for representing the sub vector (ai : i ∈ A). CW is the capacity
of the channel W and defined as :
C = max
PX
I(X;Y ) (4)
IW is the symmetric capacity of the channel W and for general
channels defined as below:
I(W ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
1
|X |W (y|x) log
W (y|x)
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
W (y|x′) (5)
This is the mutual information when the input distribution
PX is uniform.
[N ] stands for {1, ..., N}. log(.) is based on 2 in the rest
of the paper.
II. SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section we review the prior works in [6] and [15]. Our
discussion is about nonbinary discrete memoryless channels.
Such channel has the transition probability of W (y|x) and
X ,Y as input and output alphabets of channel.
Assume there exists a channel Wb with input alphabet Y
that holds following equation:
Ww(z|x) =
∑
y′∈Y
Wm(y
′|x)Wb(z|y′)∀x, z (6)
In this case, the wiretapper’s channel is stochastically de-
graded with respect to the main channel. According to [6] the
secrecy capacity is:
Cs = max
PX
{I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)} (7)
According to the concept of symmetric capacity and equa-
tion (7), by assuming uniform input distribution PX , the
capacity-equivocation region is given by:
Re ≤ R ≤ IWm , 0 ≤ Re ≤ IWm − IWw (8)
In this case the secrecy capacity define as:
Cs = IWm − IWw (9)
III. POLAR CODING
In this section important notion of polar coding is defined
which is used in our designs and proofs.
A. Primitive Definitions
Consider we have a binary-input DMC which its transition
probabilities are W (y|x) . N transition over the channel is
shown by WN (yN1 |xN1 ). The Bhattacharyya for nonbinary
input DMCs with alphabet size q is defined as one of the
two following forms[22]:
Z(W ) =
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
∑
y
√
W (x, y)W (x′, y) (10)
Z(W ) =
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
∑
y
√
W (y|x)W (y|x′)p(x)p(x′)
(11)
If uniform input distribution is assumed we have:
Z(W ) =
1
q(1− q)
∑
x,x′∈X :x6=x′
∑
y
√
W (y|x)W (y|x′) (12)
Channel polarization has two phases: channel combining
and channel splitting. uN1 is the transformed vector. The
combined channel is formed by :
WN (y
N
1 |uN1 ) ≡WN (yN1 |uN1 GN ) (13)
GN is the generator matrix of the polar code. In the channel
splitting phase, channels formed by:
W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , u
i−1
1 |ui) ≡
1
2N−1
∑
uNi+1∈XN−i
WN (y
N
1 |uN1 ) (14)
The idea of polar coding is utilizing the polarization phe-
nomenon and transmitting data using the channels for which
I(W
(i)
N ) is approximately 1.
In [11] the notation P(N,K,A, uAc) is defined for polar
code. uAc is the frozen vector . Information set (A) is chosen
such that it satisfies two conditions :first |A| = K and second
Z(W
(i)
N ) ≤ Z(W (j)N ) for all i ∈ A, j ∈ Ac. The decode has
the knowledge of frozen vector. Decoder(Successive cancel-
lation decoder) derive an estimation of the input :for frozen
indexes put uAc = uˆAc and For other indexes which satisfying
i ∈ A it puts uˆi = 0 if W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |1) ≤W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |0)
and otherwise uˆi = 1.
Recently, the results of [11] has extended to general DMCs
in [22]. These results show polar coding usage for achieving
the symmetric capacity of the DMC channels with alphabet of
size q given by (2) in which |X | = q.
Channel polarization, from the early stage proposed for
binary-input settings,and now has been generalized to arbitrary
DMCs. It is proved that when the size of input alphabet
is prime, a similar method to binary-input case leads to
polarizing the channels. This method extended to channels of
not-prime input sizes by splitting these channels to a subset of
channels that have prime input alphabet size. The extending
of polarization for channels with input alphabet of arbitrary
sizes leads to polar coding for achieving the real capacity of
arbitrary channels[22].
In this paper we skip further details of polar coding for
nonbinary input channels and use the results. For more details,
see [11] and [22].
For the rest of the paper Z(W) means equation (12).
B. Polar Coding Ensemble
Now, polar code notation is represented which is imple-
mented for defining polar coding ensemble and is used for the
rest of the paper.
Definition 1 (Polar Coding[11]): Polar code P(N,A, uF )
for every A ⊆ {1, ..., N} and uF ∈ X |F| is a linear code
according to the following notation:
P(N,A, uF ) = {xN1 = uN1 GN : uFc ∈ X |F
c|} (15)
F is frozen set and its indexes are called forzen indexes.
Also A is information set and its indexes are called informa-
tion indexes.
Definition 2 (Polar Coding Ensemble[19]):Polar code En-
semble P(N,A) for every A ⊆ {1, ..., N} represents the
Ensemble below:
P(N,A) = {P(N,A, uF ) : ∀uF ∈ X |F|} (16)
PB,e(A, uF ) represents the block error probability
P(N,A, uF ) with uniform distribution assumption on
all codewords. PB,e(A) is average block error probability
of ensemble P(N,A) means averaging PB,e(A, uF ) on all
possible choices of uF ∈ X |F| with equal probability.
Lemma 1 (Averaged Block Error Probability Upper
Bound[19]): for a B-DMC W and information set A, averaged
error probability of block (over all possible choices of frozen
vectors) can be bounded as follows:
PB,e(A) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W
(i)
N ) (17)
C. Rate of Polarization
following theorem shows the concept of polarization :
Theorem 1 (Rate of Convergence[11]):for any binary discrete
memoryless channel W, for N = 2n and δ ∈ (0, 1) :
lim
N→∞
|i ∈ [N ] : I(W (i)N ) ∈ (1− δ, 1)|
N
= I(W ) (18)
lim
N→∞
|i ∈ [N ] : I(W (i)N ) ∈ (0, δ)|
N
= 1− I(W ) (19)
Theorem 2 ([22]): For any DMC W in which R < I(W ),
parameter β ∈ (0, 1/2) is considered to be fixed. Averaged
Block error probability of polar coding satisfy the following
equality:
PB,e(A) ≤ (q − 1) ∗ 2−Nβ (20)
In which q is the input alphabet size. Now we propose a lemma
which is an extention of lemma 4.7 from [19] that used for
realizing good channels and bad channels from each other.
Lemma 2: if W : X → Y and Wd : X → Yd are two DMC
W with nonbinary input alphabet size and Wd is degraded with
respect to W then there exists a channel like Wb : Y → Yd that
Wd(yd|x) =
∑
y∈Y
W (y|x)Wb(yd|y). In this condition Wd(i)N is
degraded with respect to W (i)N and Z(Wd
(i)
N ) ≥ Z(W (i)N ).
Proof: now we should prove that inequality
Z(Wd
(i)
N ) ≥ Z(W (i)N ) holds:
Z(Wd
(i)
N ) =
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′∑
yd∈Yd
√
Wd
(i)
N (yd|x)Wd(i)N (yd|x′)p(x)p(x′)
=
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
√
p(x)p(x′)
×
∑
yd∈Yd
√
Wd
(i)
N (yd|x)Wd(i)N (yd|x′)
=
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
√
p(x)p(x′)×
∑
yd∈Yd
√∑
y∈Y
W
(i)
N (y|x)Wb(i)N (yd|y)
∑
y∈Y
W
(i)
N (y|x′)Wb(i)N (yd|y)
(a)
≥ 1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
√
p(x)p(x′)
×
∑
yd∈Yd
∑
y∈Y
√
W
(i)
N (y|x)Wb(i)N (yd|y)W (i)N (y|x′)Wb(i)N (yd|y)
=
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
√
p(x)p(x′)
×
∑
yd∈Yd
∑
y∈Y
Wb
(i)
N (yd|y)
√
W
(i)
N (y|x)W (i)N (y|x′)
=
1
1− q
∑
x,x′∈X :x 6=x′
√
p(x)p(x′)
×
∑
y∈Y
√
W
(i)
N (y|x)W (i)N (y|x′)
∑
yd∈Yd
Wb
(i)
N (yd|y) = Z(W (i)N )
(21)
(a) follows from Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
This lemma implies that with assumption of degradation of
wiretap channel with respect to main channel if a channel is
good to Eve it is good for Bob, conversely if a channel is bad
for Bob, it is Bad for Eve too.IV. PROPOSED CODING SCHEME
In this section we represent a coding scheme and prove its
security and reliability . Also we show that it achieves the rate
of secrecy capacity.
A. Secret Codebook
Assume that Alice has a confidential message M which
is to be transmitted to Bob and should be hidden from the
Eve. Reliable and secure communication is possible, if the
following conditions for any given ε > 0 be satisfied:
Reliability : PB,e(Am) ≤ ε (22)
Security :
1
N
I(M ;ZN1 ) ≤ ε (23)
Wiretap channel is degraded with respect to the main channel.
We have the following Markov chain:
U → X → (Y,Z) (24)
for sufficiently large N and 0 < β < 1/2 following sets are
defined:
Am = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Wm(i)N ) ≤
q − 1
N
2−2
nβ} (25)
Fm = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ww(i)N ) ≥
q − 1
N
2−2
nβ} (26)
According to the defined sets, Am is the good channel indexes
for the main channel and Fm is the bad channel indexes for
the wiretap channel. According to polar coding definition and
lemma 2 it is concluded that Fm ⊆ Fw,Aw ⊆ Am. The
main task is to form uN1 based on defined indexes sets. u
N
1
is the vector that multiplied by generator matrix and forms
transmitted codeword. Fig.1 demonstrates the relation between
defined indexes. In the following part the coding scheme
Fig. 1. the relation between main channel and wiretap channel indexes
has been proposed. According to definition 2 we define our
proposed coding scheme by defining frozen symbols over all
possible choices.
B. Encoding Algorithm
Secret message is mapped on the vector Vm and random
vector Vr is generated with uniformly random distribution.
Now the vector uN1 is formed as below:
1) Information symbols are sent over the indexes which
are good for the main channel and bad for the wiretap
channel. This concept could be shown by uAm\Aw =
uFw\Fm = uI message length is k and |Vm| = |Am| −
|Aw| = k.
2) We send random symbols over indexes that belong to
good channel for both main and wiretap channels as
uAw = uR.
3) Over bad channels for both equal uFm we send a frozen
vector assumed to be chosen from all possible choices
uFm ∈ X |Fm| and given to decoder of Bob and Eve.
Polar coding ensemble is used, it meants coding scheme
is built over ∀uFm ∈ X |Fm|.
Encoding is defined as the following function:
encod : {0, ..., q − 1}k × {0, ..., q − 1}r → {0, ..., q − 1}N
(27)
Input contains a secret message m ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1}k and a
random vector uR ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1}r. There is no assumption
on the message distribution but uR assumed to be choosen
randomly from {0, 1, ..., q − 1}r with uniform distribution.
C. Decoding
Decoding is divided into two subsection. Reliability satis-
faction and coding rate.
1) Reliability: Both Vm and Vr has been defined over good
indexes of main channel, thus according to theorem 3, both
of them could be decoded using SC decoding with probability
of error as PB,e(Am) = O((q − 1) ∗ 2−Nβ ) [22](averaging
over all possible choices of uFm ). So the reliability condition
is satisfied.
D. Security Proof
In this part we prove the security of the coding scheme.
Since the scheme is formed over all possible choices of frozen
symbols(polar coding ensemble), mutual information between
message and Eve evaluated using one random chosen vector
uFm over the whole set uFm ∈ X |Fm|. After choosing uFm
we fix it and ultimately we should prove that there exists such
uFm for our purpose. The decoding error probability of Eve
has been evaluated over the ensemble in average sense. Now
we have the following equations:
I(M ;Z|UF ) = I(U ;Z)− I(UR;Z|UF , UI)
(a)
= I(U ;Z)−H(UR|UF , UI) +H(UR|UI , UF , Z)
(b)
= I(U ;Z)−H(UR) +H(UR|UI , uF , Z)
(c)
≤ I(X;Z)−H(UR) +H(UR|UI , UF , Z)
(d)
≤ NI(Ww)−H(UR) +H(UR|UI , UF , Z) (28)
Equation (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information
and a consequence of the following:
I(U ;Z) = I(UI∪R∪F ;Z)
= I(UI , UR, UF ;Z)
= I(UF ;Z) + I(UI , UR;Z|UF )
= I(UI , UR;Z|UF ) (29)
The last equality in (29) derived from the fact that
I(UFm ;Z
N
1 ) equals to zero because uFm has been sent over
bad channels for both main and wiretap channels. (b) follows
form the independence of UR, UI , UF .(c) is the result of
applying the data processing inequality because of the Markov
chain M → U → X → (Y,Z). Below operations lead to (d):
I(XN1 ;Z
N
1 ) = H(Z
N
1 )−H(ZN1 |XN1 )
= H(ZN1 )−
N∑
i=1
H(Zi|Xi) ≤
∑
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Xi))
=
N∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi) ≤ NI(Ww) (30)
According to (d) for finding an upper bound for I(M ;Z|UF )
an upper bound for H(UR|UI , UF , Z) should be found. For the
upper bound of H(UR|UI , UF , Z) we propose the following
lemma:
Lemma 3: For a asymmetric binary-input channel the
Ensemble of polar code was defined which means defining
polar code over all possible choices of frozen symbols. For
proposed coding scheme defined over the ensemble there exists
a sequence uF , which with utilizing it as frozen vector, the
following inequality will be satisfied:
H(UR|Z,UI , UF )
≤ H((q − 1)2−Nβ ) + (rlog2q)× (q − 1)2−N
β
(31)
Proof: we define an error event as following:
E =
{
1 UˆR 6= UR
0 UˆR = UR
(32)
random vector is sent over good channels for both main
channel and wiretap channel so we can write Pe = PB,e(Aw)
and:
Pe = P (E = 1)
= Pr(UˆR 6= UR) ≤
∑
i∈Aw
Z(Ww
(i)
N ) ≤ (q − 1) ∗ 2−N
β
(33)
Because coding scheme is defined over all possible choices
of uFm ∈ X |Fm| and the error probability in average sense
is smaller than its upper bound,it means that there exists a
specific frozen vector uFm which is in set X |Fm| and with
choosing it the error probability does not exceed the upper
bound (q− 1) ∗ 2−Nβ . Now the term H(E,UR|UI , UF , Z) is
expanded in two ways:
H(E,UR|UI , UF , Z) =
H(UR|UI , UF , Z) +H(E|UR, UI , UF , Z) =
H(UR|E,UI , UF , Z) +H(E|UI , UF , Z) (34)
obviously the term H(E|UR, UI , UF , Z) equals zero because
with having UR there is no equivocation on Error, conse-
quently:
H(UR|UI , UF , Z) =
H(UR|E,UI , UF , Z) +H(E|UI , UF , Z) (35)
clearly eliminating the condition of entropy function do not
decrease the entropy so:
H(UR|UI , UF , Z)
≤ H(UR|E,UI , UF , Z) +H(E) (36)
a new task is to find an upper bound for the right hand side
of (36):
H(UR|E,UI , UF , Z) =
1∑
i=0
P (E = i)H(UR|E = i, UI , UF , Z)
= P (E = 1)H(UR|E = 1, UI , UF , Z) + (1− P (E = 1))× 0
= P (E = 1)H(UR|E = 1, UI , UF , Z)
≤ P (E = 1)H(UR) = Pe ∗ rlog2q (37)
according to (36) and (37):
H(UR|UI , UF , Z) ≤ H(E) + Pe ∗ rlog2q
≤ H((q − 1)2−Nβ ) + (rlog2q)× (q − 1)2−N
β
(38)
according to lemma 3 and (28):
lim
N→∞
I(M ;Z|UF )/N = lim
N→∞
{I(Ww)− rlog2q/N+
{H((q − 1)2−Nβ ) + rlog2q ∗ (q − 1)2−N
β}/N}
= lim
N→∞
{I(Ww)− rlog2q/N}
= log2q ∗ lim
N→∞
{Iq(Ww)−Hq(UR)}
≈ lim
N→∞
{Iq(Ww)− r/N} = 0 (39)
Iq(Ww) is symmetric capacity of wiretap channel if in equa-
tion (2), the base of logarithm be q and Hq(UR) is q-based
logarithmic entropy function. If R is the rate of coding then:
H(M)
N
≤ R ≤ klog2q
N
=
log2|q|k+r − log2|q|r
N
= I(Wm)− I(Ww) = CS (40)
It concludes that for achieving secrecy capacity the distri-
bution of message should be uniform, otherwise there exists a
code such that its rate R satisfy the following inequality :
H(M)
N
< R <
klog2q
N
(41)
And the code rate doesn’t achieve secrecy capacity. In-
equality H(M)/N ≤ R derives from source coding theo-
rem. So the security of coding scheme is proved because
lim
N→∞
I(M ;Z)/N is equivalent to lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z)/k. Equation
(39) holds because according to the definition of polar coding
I(Ww)
N→∞≡ |Aw|/N .
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We briefly mention our results and certain extensions of
them. So far, nonbinary-input asymmetric wiretap channels
have been considered in this paper. We proved that there
exists some choices of frozen symbols for which coding
scheme satisfies reliability and security conditions. Also it
has been proved that the necessary condition for achieving
secrecy capacity is uniform distribution of the message set.
An open problem is to construct codes for the situation
where the wiretap channel is not degraded with respect to
the main channel.for example if Eve has just a less noisy
channel than Bob. Our coding scheme is not totally explicit
because only existence of a frozen vector that is suitable for
our setting has been proven. Another problem is successive
cancellation decoding depends on the past estimates of itself
that should be correct otherwise that will propagate error.
Implementing another decoder for overcoming this setback is
of great interest. Recently in [23] a method has been suggested
for overcoming the polarization limitation. The method is
based on defining pseudorandom frozen bits and extent to all
kind of channels. Using results in [23] to extend our results
to arbitrary discrete memolyless channels is a thrilling task.
It was shown by Maurer-Wolf [4] that any coding scheme
that satises the weak security condition can be converted to
a coding scheme that satises the stronger condition (3). This
has been accomplished using information reconciliation and
privacy amplication protocol [24]. So the results of this paper
could be extented to strong security using results of privacy
amplication protocol.
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